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ARGUMENT 
! 
I. Standard iof Review 
When a decisif n on a motion to suppress is challenged, the trial court's findings of fac~ 
which are supported bl substantial evidence are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous; 
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found is freely reviewed. 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). "When a district 
court has rendered an rntermediate appellate decision, we examine the record before the 
magistrate independ1tly of, but with due regard for, the district court's determination." Id. "In 
reviewing an order grflllting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the Supreme Court will 
I 
defer to the trial courtfs factual findings unless clearly erroneous." State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 
I 
885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2,01). 
II. Introduction 
I 
i 
The sentencin~judge here did not order a Fourth Amendment waiver. The probation 
agreement Santana was required to sign several weeks later could not properly circumscribe 
I 
Santana's Fourth Amendment rights because only the sentencing court may set substantive terms 
of probation. A prob~tioner cannot voluntarily consent to waiver of constitutional rights when 
the waiver is contained in a compulsory agreement, thus Santana did not voluntarily consent to 
waive his Fourth Amendment rights when he signed the probation agreement as he was required. 
In Idaho probationers and parolees have less privacy rights than free citizens, however their 
rights are only diminished not obliterated. Warrantless searches of probationers and parolees 
must be based upon reasonable suspicion/reasonable grounds. The magistrate below properly 
found that there was no reasonable suspicion/reasonable grounds for the search of Santana's 
home as there was no exigent need for the probation officers to confirm or disclose a probation 
or a reason to 
was on 
and magistrate courts below properly 
were not as a term 
1. Misdemeanor probationers, as Santana, retain more of 
constitutional rights than felony probationers and parolees 
are a 
rights citizenship, can be incarcerated for long 
under the jurisdiction of the state Board of Corrections. The 
probation without 
probation 
probation, the probation 
statutory scheme 
probation 
is an court 
the power to move a 
not have 
the 
to the court and showing how the defendant 
as can 
are not to a 
court at 
I 
I 
and probation officers/ cannot impose more, or any, discretionary jail time other than what has 
been court-ordered. j 
Felony parolees are subject to an even greater diminution of rights. The U.S. Supreme 
I 
Court in Samson v. California noted that, "parolees are on a continuum of state-imposed 
punishments ... [J]n this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than 
probationers, because/parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment ... 
on the Court's continlum of possible punishments, parole is the stronger medicine; ergo, parolees 
I 
enjoy even less of th~ average citizen's absolute liberty than do probationers." 547 U.S. at 850, 
126 S. Ct. at 2199, 1/5 L.Ed.2d 250. 
In State v. Josephson, the court of appeal declined to find, "that a [Fourth Amendment 
! 
waiver] probation teqn properly may be imposed in all cases. Our courts' discretion in setting 
! 
terms of probation is hot unbounded." 125 Idaho 119,123,867 P.2d 993,994 (Ct. App. 1993). 
! 
Given this continuum, a misdemeanor probationer, such as Santana would have a higher 
expectation of privacy than a felony probationer, or a parolee. The court in State v. Turek 
I 
I 
recognized that whil~ the purposes of probation can certainly be advanced by allowing probation 
officers to conduct u~estricted, unannounced searches of a probationer's residence, "we must 
keep in mind that theiprobationers' expectation of privacy is merely diminished, not obliterated." 
150 Idaho 745,752,250 P.3d. 796, 803 (Ct. App. 2011). 
2. Misdemeanor probation officers are agents of the Court and carry out its 
will. Terms and conditions of probation must be court-ordered and the 
d~f endant must have notice of, and agree to those terms 
The power and discretion to grant probation and set the substantive terms of probation 
! 
lay solely with the Crurt. Under Idaho Code 19-2601(2) the court in its discretion may: 
"[ s ]uspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during the term 
I 
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waiver of constitutional rights to from warrantless searches and seizures, 
[defendant] is deemed to have 'consented' to the search of his residence."); State v. Pecor, 132 
Idaho 359,364, 972 P.2d. 737, 742 (1998) (Defendant acknowledged he had consented to 
warrantless searches as a condition of probation."); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 842, 736 
P.2d 1295, 1296 (The order waiving his Fourth Amendment rights indicated that defendant, "had 
6 
certified to a reading kd understanding of the terms of that order, and that he accepted those 
I 
terms and signed the ~rder."); State v. De Vore, 143 Idaho 344,347, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Ct. App. 
2000) (Defendant fouhd to have waived his rights as a condition of his probation.); U.S. v. 
I 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 122 S.Ct. 587, 590, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (Defendant, ''was 
unambiguously infoJed of the search condition"); Samson v. California 541 U.S. 843,848, 126 
I 
S.Ct. 2193, 2197, 165 L.Ed. 250 (Defendant was a parolee, and every prisoner eligible for 
release on state paroil in California was required to agree in writing to a Fourth Amendment 
waiver). Thus, not oAiy is it crucial that the sentencing court actually order a Fourth Amendment 
I 
I 
waiver, it is also crucial that the defendant be fully aware of that to which they are agreeing. 
"Conditions [ofprob1ion] that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights 
I 
I 
may properly be subj~ct to special scrutiny .... " U.S. v. Conseulo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,265 
(9th Cir. 1975). I 
3. Je Court's probation order here did not impose a Fourth Amendment 
Waiver; probation's agreement could not add to or modify the Court's 
order without specific Court approval. 
I 
The magistrate here found that the "entire issue of consent to warrantless searches and/or 
Fourth Amendment waivers" was: (1) not specifically addressed at sentencing, (2) that the box 
ordering Fourth Amendment waivers on the judgment form was not checked by the sentencing 
court, (3) that there was nothing in the stipulated facts that "even suggested" that when the 
sentencing court, "or~ered the defendant to go to misdemeanor probatioll, sign an agreement and 
abide by their rules ahd reporting requirements ... that the judge even knew he was ordering 
I 
Fourth Amendment rights to be waived," and ( 4) that "clearly at the time of sentencing ... there 
I 
was nothing to alert the defendant that waiving the Fourth Amendment rights was a condition of 
I 
that probation." (6/18/15 Tr., P. 9, L.10-p. 10, L. 5.) The district court further noted that there, 
I 
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The court first found that on the continuum of state imposed punishments parole is more akin to 
I 
imprisonment than plbation, that parolees are in the legal custody of the California Department 
of Corrections, and that as such the California legislature had concluded that a "reasonable 
I 
suspicion" requirement gives parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal 
criminality because cllifomia law releases inmates on parole after a designated period of time 
I 
irrespective ofwhethet they "are capable of integrating" back into productive society. Id., 541 
I 
U.S. at 850-854; 126 ~.Ct. at 2198-2201; 165 L.Ed.2d 250. Taking the foregoing into 
i 
I 
consideration along with other information in the legislative history, the court then upheld 
I 
California's statute anr found that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from 
conducting a suspicio41ess search of a parolee. Id. 541 U.S. 857; 126 S.Ct. 2202; 165 L.Ed.2d 
I 
250. The court noted however, that--contrary to the dissent's claims that California's parole 
I 
search law permits a blanket grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards-it 
I 
I 
found that there were *ome safeguards in that California required that the searches must not be 
arbitrary, capricious or harassing. Id. 541 U.S. 856; 126 S.Ct. 2202; 165 L.Ed.2d 250. 
I 
I 
In 1983, State v. Pinson laid out the requirements in Idaho for a search of a probationers' 
home when there has been no Fourth Amendment waiver, or other consent. State v. Pinson, I 04 
Idaho 227,657 P.2d 1095 (1983). The defendant, Pinson, was a felony probationer. Id. There 
I 
is nothing in the case io indicate Pinson had waived his Fourth Amendment rights and the Court 
I 
appears to assume.that he did not. Id. Pinson's probation officer received ·two telephone calls 
I 
from Pinson' s mother ,who advised that she believed Pinson had drugs in his possession and that 
he may have burglarir the trailer next to her mobile home. Id. I 04 Idaho at 229-230, 657 P.2d 
at 1097-1098. The pr?bation officer with a sheriff's deputy went to Pinson's mother's home 
where Pinson was statng and confronted him about the burglary. Id. Pinson denied any 
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